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Representatives of national governments, international organisations, 
businesses and NGOs assembled on 4 February in London for the 
high-profile conference “Supporting Syria & the Region”, jointly 
hosted by  the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Kuwait and 
the United Nations.1 After three previous pledging conferences on 
the Syria crisis that barely scraped together the necessary funding 
to keep Syrian refugees in the neighbouring states alive, this year 
witnessed a change in tack. Not only were funding expectations 
largely met, but the conference also aimed to develop an entirely 
new formula for integrating refugees into the neighbouring states 
that host them. Besides improving access to education, this centred 
on ways to allow Syrians to access the labour market. Now that the 
dust has settled a little, it may be time to ask: what are the chances 
for these aspirations to actually materialise? 
This policy brief first looks at how the overall context of the pledging 
conferences has changed, and surveys the main promises and plans 
presented in the course of the conference. It then takes a critical look 
at the situation in Jordan – currently seen as the most promising 
candidate for sweeping policy change regarding its Syrian refugee 
population. It shows how the devil is in the details of governing 
Syrian labour and socio-economic development projects, and 
traces previous attempts for such changes. It argues that changing 
labour market regulations is not the silver bullet hoped for by the 
international community, but that real change can only come about 
if Europe rethinks its priorities vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis.  
1.  ‘Supporting Syria and the Region: London 2016’ (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
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New incentives for change 
In comparison with past, much less successful 
pledging conferences, this round of talks was 
backdropped by the arrival of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals – a large part of them 
Syrian – to Europe over the course of the past year, 
as well as the deaths of many others. A felt need 
on the part of many governments to manage this 
influx of people and to prevent more from coming 
has made European and other donor countries 
acutely aware of the dire situation in which Syrians 
find themselves in Syria and its neighbouring states, 
and has increased their willingness to engage with 
the situation of refugees in the region.2 After all, 
this is where the large majority of Syrian refugees 
currently live. Of the 4.6 million registered Syrian 
refugees in the region, 3 Turkey has the highest 
absolute number (with 1.9 million), while Lebanon 
and Jordan have the highest per capita rates of 
Syrian refugees: around 25% of the population in 
Lebanon, and around 7-15% in Jordan, depending 
on who does the counting as well as who is counted.    
Numbers are important. There has been a subtle 
competition between governments in the region 
to present the most dramatic indicators regarding 
the numbers of refugees and the concomitant 
hardships for host communities, so as to not be 
forgotten in the funding pledges. A week before the 
donors’ conference, for example, the Government 
of Jordan released the preliminary results of the 
2. See e.g. Kingsley, P.: ‘Syrian refugees in Jordan: “If they 
cut the coupons, we will probably die”’, The Guardian, 3 
Feb 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016).  
3. In addition to that, there is an unknown number of Syr-
ians displaced by the conflict within Syria as well as in the 
region, who are not registered as refugees. Saudi Arabia 
claims, for example, to have taken in up to a million Syr-
ians since 2011; see De Bel-Air, F.: ‘A note on Syrian refu-
gees in the Gulf: Attempting to assess data and policies’, 
Explanatory Note No. 11/2015, Gulf Labour Market and 
Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migration Poli-
cy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC). 
census conducted in November / December 2015.4 
According  to this document, there are almost 1.3 
million Syrians currently residing in Jordan – more 
than twice as many as the 635,000 registered with 
UNHCR in the country. The government hopes 
that these numbers will reinforce the urgency of its 
call for sustained support from the international 
community. 
From the donors’ point of view, this support can no 
longer be humanitarian and financial only. The past 
few years already witnessed attempts to move the 
refugee response away from humanitarian thinking, 
which focused mostly on short-term emergency 
assistance, and towards a more development-
oriented mindset that seeks to increase the 
resilience of refugees and local populations alike.5 
However, up until this point there were certain red 
lines that everybody knew could not be crossed. 
More than anything, host states in the region – 
except for Turkey, none of them are signatories to 
the Geneva convention6 – did not want to allow 
refugees access to the labour market. While a large 
number of Syrians work informally, granting them 
formal access would mean an acknowledgement 
that Syrians are no longer temporary guests but will 
be staying for an indefinite amount of time – an 
idea that plays no better in the domestic politics of 
neighbouring states than it does in Europe. What 
is more, politicians view the large-scale provision 
of work permits to Syrians as unacceptable given 
the already significant unemployment of local 
populations, and oft-reported instances of tension 
between host communities and refugees over jobs 
4. See Ghazal, M.: ‘Population stands at around 9.5 million, 
including 2.9 million guests’. The Jordan Times, 30 Jan 
2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
5. See ‘Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in Re-
sponse to the Syria Crisis: Regional Strategic Overview’, 
UNDP & UNHCR, 2015.
6. Turkey has signed the Geneva Convention but applies it 
only to citizens of member states of the Council of Eu-
rope. 
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and resources. Accordingly, attempts to involve 
Syrians in livelihoods programming were refuted 
or refused by host governments for years. In 
consequence, support to Syrian refugees often had 
to continue to focus on food and cash assistance, 
although these forms of support decreased due to 
severe cuts in donor funding. These have further 
contributed to the destitute situation of many 
refugees in the region.7 
In the lead-up to the London conference, however, 
the wind has changed. The movements of refugees 
and migrants to Europe have thrown not only 
Syrian refugees’ increasing material hardship into 
stark relief, but also their frustration with their 
(lack of) options in the neighbouring states. The 
search for dignity has compelled many to head 
for Europe, or, disturbingly, return to Syria.8 The 
realisation that it takes more than keeping people 
alive to stop them from migrating has moved the 
question of employment to centre stage. Access to 
formal employment and education are now seen 
as core elements of a new strategy. Donors and 
international organisations have been pushing for 
significant changes in this regard, trying to gauge 
what is needed to convince the host governments 
to follow suit in a series of shuttle diplomacy visits. 
Pledges, promises and plans 
On first glance, this process seems to have been 
relatively successful. The sums pledged at the 
London donors conference were higher than at any 
of the three previous conferences. Even though the 
7. See e.g. CARE Jordan: ‘5 Years Into Exile. The challenges 
faced by Syrian refugees outside camps in Jordan and 
how they and their host communities are coping’. Am-
man, June 2015; UNHCR et al: ‘Vulnerability Assessment 
of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 2015 Report’, Dec 2015 
(accessed 10 Feb 2016).
8. see e.g. Achilli, L.: ‘Back to Syria? Conflicting patterns 
of mobility among Syrian refugees in Jordan’, Orient, I, 
2016, 7-13. 
almost six billion USD pledged so far do not meet 
the nine billion USD requested by UNHCR for 
2016, two-thirds fulfilment is seen as a very good 
starting sign. In addition, significant additional 
pledges have already been made for the following 
three years. Particularly Germany and Britain, 
who already occupied the second and third spots 
on the list of bilateral donors behind the US, have 
upped their promised funding. Their choices follow 
different logics. Germany has received the largest 
numbers of refugees and is thus trying to curb 
further movements, whereas Britain has consistently 
pursued the strategy of paying more for the regional 
refugee response while denying entry to substantial 
numbers of refugees.9 Other countries like France, 
Norway and Italy have stepped up their pledges as 
well. 10 
In addition, Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) and donors announced around 40 billion 
USD in loans. A small percentage of these (around 
4%) are being made available on concessional 
terms, meaning that they have considerably lower 
interest rates than normal loans for upper middle 
income countries like Jordan and Lebanon. These 
grants and loans are part of a package that seeks 
to explicitly support host countries’ opening up of 
their labour markets to refugees, other elements 
of which include easier access to external (esp. 
European) markets and increased external support 
for job creation programmes. This, theoretically at 
least, should benefit local populations and refugees 
alike. A variety of such measures were mentioned in 
the concluding statements of the conference. They 
make it seem like a new era in responding to the 
refugee crisis has begun. The co-hosts’ conference 
declaration boldly states that “with these efforts, 
9. Harding, L., P. Oltermann & N. Watt: ‘Refugees wel-
come? How UK and Germany compare on migration’. 
The Guardian, 2 Sept 2015 (accessed 10 Feb 2016) 
10.  ‘Co-host’s statement annex: fundraising’, Supporting Syr-
ia & the Region, London 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016).  
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we estimate that up to 1.1m jobs will be created for 
refugees from Syria and host country citizens in the 
region by 2018.”11
Seductive words, but the route to substantive 
policy changes with regard to employment – let 
alone to mass employment creation – is much 
more complicated. Turkey has recently passed new 
legislation that theoretically enables Syrians to access 
the formal labour market. Not much has changed 
on the ground yet, not least because of on-going 
negotiations with EU countries over funding and 
reciprocation. Thus, it remains to be seen what will 
come of these formal modifications.12 The Lebanese 
government, in turn, has stressed that it is not willing 
to change any of its current labour legislation, 
which largely prevents Syrians from working in 
the country legally. As a symbolic concession, it 
proposes to establish a pilot employment project 
that will set up small and medium enterprises that 
can provide permanent employment for Lebanese 
and temporary employment for Syrians. At the same 
time, GoL officials stress that this project is part of 
facilitating Syrians’ return to Syria or resettlement 
elsewhere.13
While Turkey may be the bigger fish, many policy-
makers currently see Jordan as the most promising 
laboratory for testing new approaches to the 
refugee crisis. The idea floated by international 
advisors is to foster a Syrian economy in exile, 
thereby incubating a post-conflict economy  that 
can be transplanted into Syria when the time 
comes. This could be done, so the argument goes, 
by establishing or re-purposing a number of Special 
11. ‘Co-hosts declaration from the Supporting Syria & the 
Region Conference, London 2016’ (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
12.  Peers, S. & Roman, E.: ‘The EU, Turkey and the Refugee 
Crisis: What could possibly go wrong?’, EU Law Analysis, 
5 Feb 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
13. ‘Bassil says London conference test for international 
community’, The Daily Star, 3 Feb 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 
2016).
Economic Zones focused on manufacturing, 
especially in the northern governorates where 
a majority of Syrian refugees are concentrated. 
Composed of international and Syrian companies 
employing both Syrians and Jordanians, such an 
endeavour would purportedly not only solve the 
issue of Syrian employment but simultaneously 
help Jordan to finally become a serious player in 
manufacturing, thereby killing two birds with one 
stone.14 This idea has been officially embraced. 
The statement made by the Jordanian government 
after the conference envisions “turning the Syrian 
refugee crisis into a development opportunity that 
attracts new investments and opens up the EU 
market (…), creating jobs for Jordanians and Syrian 
refugees whilst supporting the post-conflict Syrian 
economy”. 15 
The devil is in the details: debating policy 
change in Jordan  
While this stance has been welcomed by many 
in the international arena, it stands in marked 
contrast to the more common narrative of 
Jordanian officials. This second narrative, which 
has dominated the discussion in Jordan for years, is 
much more reluctant and cautious. It speaks of the 
suffering of the Jordanian population much more 
than the potential of a thriving Syrian economy. In 
the lead-up to the conference, King Abdullah II, 
the Jordanian Monarch, personally intervened on 
several occasions to underline the gravity of the 
situation. He emphasised that the wellbeing of hard-
hit Jordanians is his first priority, and stressed that 
14. Betts, A. and Collier, P.: ‘Help Refugees Help Themselves: 
Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labor Market’, Foreign Af-
fairs, 94(6), 20 Oct 2015 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
15. ‘The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International 
Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis’, Sup-
porting Syria & the Region, London 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 
2016)
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Jordan will not continue to accommodate Syrian 
refugees without significant international support. 
“How can we be a contributor to regional stability if 
we are let down by the international community?” 
he asked provocatively. Other politicians have made 
it equally clear that Jordan will not change its policies 
or continue to provide support at current levels 
unless grants, loans and substantial investments 
are forthcoming.16 This corresponds with much of 
public opinion. Even columnists that are usually 
sympathetic to the plight of Syrian refugees in the 
country are now starting to advocate for policy 
measures that demonstrably put Jordan ‘first’.17
First reactions from Jordanian officials after the 
conference were positive and displayed satisfaction 
with the promised funding and concessions on offer. 
The Minister of Planning, for example, reportedly 
described the EU’s announcement to reconsider 
and simplify rules of origin on Jordanian exports as 
a breakthrough that would create tens of thousands 
of jobs.18 Yet the question remains if things will work 
out as intended. Actual funding has consistently 
fallen short of the initial pledges in past years. Also, 
the facilitation of EU trade regulations and similar 
concessions are mere statements of intent so far. It 
is unclear what actual compromises will look like or 
what they will actually change. 
Arguably, the creation of tens of thousands of jobs 
in special development zones will hinge on much 
more than concessionary loans and simplified 
rules of origin for Jordanian exports to the EU 
(one of the facilitation measures on offer). This is 
not the first time Jordan will attempt to reinvent 
16. See e.g. ‘Gov’t spokesman urges international community 
to shoulder its responsibilities towards refugees’, Ammon-
news, 1 Feb 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
17. e.g. Khitan, F.: ‘The London Conference – Jordan’s inter-
ests first’ (Arabic). Al-Ghad, 31 Jan 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 
2016).  
18. Obeidat, O. & Malkawi, K.: ‘Jordan succeeded in attract-
ing world’s attention, help — PM’, The Jordan Times, 7 Feb 
2016 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
its economic base. Since the mid-1990s, it has 
experimented with special development zones and 
different types of preferential free-trade agreements 
– Qualified Industrial Zones, the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone, and a number of smaller Special 
Development Zones across the country. While 
some of these initiatives have been reasonably 
successful in attracting foreign investors and raising 
export levels, they have not been able to meet many 
of the hopes and expectations placed in them. 
None of them has managed to square the circle 
of developing a sustainable, globally competitive 
model that simultaneously creates local jobs.19 
The percentage of local labour in the Qualified 
Industrial Zones – ostensibly meant to boost local 
employment – has remained low because most 
Jordanians are unwilling to work for such low wages 
and under bad, sweat-shop like working conditions. 
Most of these jobs are thus currently filled by 
migrants from south Asia. 20 This experience could 
very well repeat itself in the zones anticipated now. 
Instead of being a magic bullet, they could end up 
creating very little employment for both Jordanians 
and Syrian refugees. While Syrians in Jordan are 
known to work for low wages given their current 
predicament, experts have strongly questioned 
whether they could conceivably be slotted into the 
economic model of the QIZ. These have historically 
been staffed by single female migrant workers, who 
are able to make do on very little money because 
they live in worker compounds and have few in-
country expenses. This is not the case for Syrians, 
who very often must support families – including 
19. De Bel-Air, F. and Dergarabedian, A.: ‘Migrations de 
travail, globalisation et politique. Les zones industrielles 
qualifiantes (QIZ) de Jordanie’, in De Bel-Air, F. (ed.), 
Migration et politique au Moyen-Orient, Beirut: Institut 
Français du Proche-Orient, 2006, 39-60; Moore, P. W.: 
‘The newest Jordan: Free trade, peace and an ace in the 
hole’, MER Online, 26 June 2003 (accessed 10 Feb 2016).
20. Kalan, J.: ‘Workers rights: Migrant workers in Jordan are 
making their voices heard’, ILO News, 12 Feb 2012 (ac-
cessed 10 Feb 2016). 
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paying rent – who are living in Jordan as well.21 
Acknowledging that current plans might be overly 
optimistic, voices in Jordan’s Ministry of Planning 
have already conceded that the number of jobs that 
might emerge based on the anticipated investments 
might be much less than officially projected.22
Apart from the question of demand for such 
employment, we also do not know how many 
Syrians will ultimately be allowed access to it, or 
to the wider Jordanian labour market as a whole. 
In theory, it has been possible for Syrians in Jordan 
to obtain work permits since the beginning of 
the mass influx. There is no special legislation 
for refugee populations. Rather, Syrian refugees 
have continued to be treated as migrant workers. 
This has had several consequences: for one, it has 
meant that only a limited number of professions 
are open to them – a fact that has, for example, 
prevented most white-collar professionals from 
working in their fields of expertise. Changes to 
this policy have not been discussed to date. On 
the contrary, government representatives have 
assured local audiences that these regulations will 
remain in place.23 Two, it has meant that the specific 
vulnerabilities and problems that come with being 
a refugee have been largely neglected, and hence 
the process of obtaining work permits has been 
blurry at best. Refugees are often unable to fulfil 
the requirements for the application, e.g. showing 
a valid passport, or proper documentation of their 
‘bailout’ from Al-Za’atari refugee camp. On top of 
this, while the fees for a work permit are formally 
paid by the employer, in practice Syrian workers 
themselves must often provide the cash to do so. 
21. Al-Sarayrah, R.: ‘Issue of Syrian employment in Jor-
dan among the priorities of the London donor confer-
ence’  (Arabic), Al-Ghad, 24 Jan 2016 (accessed 10 Feb 
2016). 
22. See Kingsley, op. cit. 
23. ‘Gov’t sends messages of assurance over integrating Syr-
ians into labour force’, The Jordan Times, 11 Feb 2016 (ac-
cessed 11 Feb 2016)
With an annual cost of anywhere between 170 and 
800 JOD (248 and 1,128 USD), it is utterly unfeasible 
for most Syrians to actually apply for permits.24 
As a result of these manifold requirements, the 
amount of work permits given to Syrians to date 
has been relatively negligible. Syrians have also 
faced increasing restrictions on their freedom of 
movement in the country, including being forcibly 
returned to Za’atari camp if found without proper 
documentation. Such policing, combined with not 
infrequent raids on worksites, makes it difficult for 
many to find (and keep) work at all.25 This means 
that changes are not just needed on the legal level, 
but also in the minutia of the application process. It 
also means that one set of policies cannot contradict 
another, and this requires harmonising goals at a 
broader level of strategy. 
Another aspect that will make it hard to change 
policies in practice is the widespread charge that 
Syrians are crowding out Jordanians from the 
labour market. Such oft-repeated arguments need to 
be treated with caution. While the Syrian crisis has 
certainly exacerbated pre-existing problems related 
to infrastructure, resources and services, the picture 
is more complicated when it comes to the labour 
market. While some such competition does occur 
among low-skilled informal labourers, available 
studies show that competition between Syrians and 
Jordanians is actually quite limited because they 
rarely work in the same sectors. Syrian men most 
often take jobs in construction, retail, and services, 
employment which most Jordanians eschew due to 
low pay and harsh working conditions. As a result, 
competition is often primarily between Syrians 
themselves, or between Syrians and Egyptian 
migrant workers.26 Yet despite this evidence the 
24. International Labour Organization: ‘Work permits for 
Syrian refugees’, Amman, 2015 (accessed 10 Feb 2016). 
25. See Francis, A.: ‘Jordan’s Refugee Crisis’, Paper, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 21 Sept 2015 (ac-
cessed 10 Feb 2016).
26. Stave, S. E. and Kattaa, M.: ‘Labour force and unemploy-
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argument that Syrians are crowding out Jordanians 
from the labour market remains omnipresent in 
public discourse. This will make it hard to change gear 
and open up the labour market for Syrians. To wit, 
in the lead-up to the London conference Jordanian 
officials announced that a significant percentage 
of the jobs created in the Special Economic Zones 
to be will be reserved for Jordanians. Yet if these 
jobs do not attract enough Jordanian labour, as in 
the past, it may well provide an excuse for further 
delaying the issuance of work permits to Syrians, 
thereby maintaining the status quo. Many in Jordan 
would prefer this. Even if more voices than ever 
before are now publicly arguing that Jordan can 
only gain from officially integrating Syrians into the 
labour force, their voices are still overshadowed by 
the dominant anti-integrationist rhetoric. 27
In fact, this is not the first time official commitments 
were made to open up the labour market. In 
November 2015, the Jordanian government already 
agreed in negotiations with donors and international 
organisations to open up the formal labour market 
to Syrians through a series of measures, provided 
that this decision is not publicised in the media.28 
This goes to show that many conflicting interests 
must be negotiated for any substantive progress 
to be achieved in this area. There is a large variety 
of governmental agencies and political groupings 
in the country that relate to Syrians in Jordan in 
different ways – some through a security lens, 
others through a humanitarian approach, and yet 
others with a view to increasing possible crisis-
related funding. Even though a new chord has now 
ment trends among Jordanians, Syrians and Egyptians in 
Jordan: 2010-2014’, Beirut: ILO & FAFO, Nov 2015 (ac-
cessed 2 Feb 2016). 
27. See Al-Khatib, B. and Lenner, K. for RLS (eds.): Alterna-
tive Voices on the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: An In-
terview Collection, Ramallah: Rosa Luxemburg Founda-
tion, 2015 (accessed 10 Feb 2016).
28. Interview by the author with ILO livelihoods specialist, 
Amman, Nov. 2015. 
been struck in public, this does not mean that these 
diverging perspectives will suddenly disappear. 
Balancing them will remain a challenge with an 
unclear outcome, and will keep feeding into the way 
the thorny issue of employment is handled.
No silver bullets
On top of all this, even if labour market integration 
becomes a reality it will not be the silver bullet 
hoped for by European policy makers. The 
possibility of formal sector jobs will not keep 
Syrians from leaving the region. People decide 
to move for a variety of reasons, which cannot be 
reduced to economic factors alone.29 Rather than 
just pressuring neighbouring states to open up their 
labour markets, European countries would do well 
to devise ways to get Syrian refugees to Europe 
safely, distribute them justly, and give them a chance 
for a dignified life in Europe, or more will die off the 
European coast. 
Tens of thousands of people are currently fleeing 
from Aleppo for Turkey, where they will become 
refugees if they are lucky enough to be let in. How 
to stop the situation from getting even worse? In 
the end, the only real way to prevent the further 
exacerbation of the refugee crisis is a political 
resolution to the Syrian conflict. That requires a 
very different sort of conference than the one we 
saw in London, but it would certainly do more 
to solve the problem than tightening the screws 
on neighbouring countries. But peace talks have 
just been postponed again, with no resolution in 
sight.  While raised levels of support and cautious 
indications of stronger future integration of Syrian 
refugees in the neighbouring states are certainly 
cause for hope, many open questions remain – 
including where Europe’s priorities should lie. 
29. See Achilli, L.: ‘Tariq al-Euroba - Displacement Trends 
of Syrian Asylum Seekers to the EU’, MPC RR 2016/01, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence: 
European University Institute, 2016. 
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